早稲田月・金セミナー　（早稲田大学現代政治経済研究所船木部会研究会)

• 「数理経済学、社会的選択論、ゲーム理論、実験経済学」を テーマとしたセミナーです．
• 毎月2,3回，原則的に月曜日か金曜日に16時30分から18時に 早稲田大学早稲田キャンパス1号館2階「現代政治経済研究所会議室」で開催されます．
• 興味を持たれた方は日程等をご確認の上，直接会場にお越し下さい．事前連絡等は不要です．
• スケジュール（予定）は下記をご参照下さい．
• 早稲田キャンパス1号館の位置はこちらをご覧ください。
• お問い合わせや報告の希望等は　　までご連絡下さい．

近日開催セミナー詳細

• 日時：3月23日（火）16時30分から18時
• 場所：早稲田大学早稲田キャンパス1号館2階現代政治経済研究所会議室
• 報告者：Bettina Klaus 氏(ローザンヌ大学）
• 題目：Recent developments in matching markets: matching with contracts (including couples markets, preference domains, and stability concepts)※若手研究者向けセミナー
• 概要：TBA

• 日時：3月24日（水）16時30分から18時
• 場所：早稲田大学早稲田キャンパス1号館2階現代政治経済研究所会議室
• 報告者：Bettina Klaus 氏(ローザンヌ大学）
• 題目：Recent developments in matching markets: farsightedness and stochastic stability (applied to marriage, roommate, and maybe housing markets)※若手研究者向けセミナー
• 概要：TBA

• 日時：3月30日（火）16時30分から18時
• 場所：早稲田大学早稲田キャンパス1号館2階現代政治経済研究所会議室
• 報告者：Bettina Klaus 氏(ローザンヌ大学）
• 題目：Allocation via Deferred-Acceptance under Responsive Priorities
• 概要：TBA

• 日時：3月30日（火）10時30分から12時
• 場所：早稲田大学早稲田キャンパス1号館2階現代政治経済研究所会議室
• 報告者：西條辰義　氏（大阪大学）
• 題目：A Solution to Prisoner's Dilemma: 100% Cooperation in the Experiment with Approval Stage（報告は英語で行われる予定）
• 概要：Players can approve or reject the other choice of the strategy after playing a Prisoner’s Dilemma game. If both approve the other choice, the outcome is what they choose, and if either one rejects the other, it is the outcome when both defect called the Mate Selection Mechanism. The subgame perfect equilibria of this two stage game have the outcomes where both are cooperative and both are defective. However, the all pairs of weakly evolutionarily stable strategies coincide with the subgame perfect equilibria where both are cooperative and we observed 100% cooperation in the experimental session of prisoner’s dilemma game with approval stage, and 7.9% cooperation in the session of the game without the approval stage.
  

2009年度後期スケジュール（予定）

終了したセミナー（2009年度後期）

• 日時：10月16日（金）16時30分から18時
• 場所：早稲田大学早稲田キャンパス1号館2階現代政治経済研究所会議室
• 報告者：Robert Veszteg 氏（Universidad Carlos III de Madrid）
• 題目：Learning and playing best response in the hide-and-seek game
• 概要：We study short and long-run behavior in hide-and-seek games in which treatments vary with symmetric and asymmetric labeling and with framing. We find that long-run behavior is not affectd by the treatment variables. In particular, we do not find that subjects fall prey to the usual focal point bias. We also study to what extent level-k reasoning, Nash equilibrium, quantal response equilibrium (QRE), fictitious play, reinforcement learning, and experience-weighted attraction (EWA) learning organize the data. All analyzed versions of these models predict the same outcome for this game. For short-run behavior, our data can not be well organized by level-k reasoning. It can be considered as the results of random play. For long-run behavior and behavior over time, the learning models outperform the static equilibrium solutions for hiders and seekers both jointly and separately. Our results suggest that experimental subjects start the game using the available actions randomly and they adjust their strategies to the opponent’s observed behavior.

• 日時：11月2日（月）16時30分から18時
• 場所：早稲田大学早稲田キャンパス1号館2階現代政治経済研究所会議室
• 報告者：グレーヴァ香子 氏（慶應義塾大学）
• 題目：Voluntarily Separable Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with Reference Letters
• 概要：We consider voluntarily separable repeated Prisoner's Dilemma in which a pair of players meet randomly and repeatedly play Prisoner's Dilemma only by mutual agreement. While the literature dealt with the case of no information flow across partnerships, we consider the case that players can issue a "reference letter" to verify at least that the partnership entered the cooperation phase. We show that such reference letters can be voluntarily provided by the partners even at some cost, and that the sheer existence of a letter shortens the trust-building periods and thus improves social efficiency.

• 日時：11月9日（月）16時30分から18時
• 場所：早稲田大学早稲田キャンパス8号館5階会議室
• 報告者：Gustavo Bergantinos 氏（University of Vigo）
• 題目：The family of cost monotonic and cost additive rules in minimum costspanning tree problems
• 概要：TBA

• 日時：11月12日（木）16時30分から18時
• 場所：早稲田大学早稲田キャンパス1号館4階401教室
• 報告者：Gustavo Bergantinos 氏（University of Vigo）
• 題目：The division problem with voluntary participation
• 概要：TBA

• 日時：11月26日（木）16時30分から18時
• 場所：早稲田大学早稲田キャンパス1号館4階401教室
• 報告者： 浅古泰史氏（日本銀行金融研究所）
• 題目：Partially Binding Platforms and the Advantages of Being an Extreme Candidate
• 概要：GLOPEII web pageをご参照下さい．

• 日時：11月27日（金）16時30分から18時
• 場所：早稲田大学早稲田キャンパス1号館2階現代政治経済研究所会議室※3号館2階第三会議室（変更になりました）
• 報告者：加藤晋 氏（東京大学）
• 題目：Conditions for Cyclic Social Preference
• 概要：Our aims is to describe how we can capture the structure of Collective choice rule without the field expansion lemma. We consider two requirements on social preference cycle: acyclicity and　Suzumura consistency. We first examine procedural conditions for an acyclic collective choice rule. Recently, Schwartz [A Procedural Condition Necessary and Sufficient for Cyclic Social preference, J. Econ. Theory 137 (2007), 688-695] has provided a generalization of the voting paradox by using the impotent partition condition. We provide another procedural condition, and show another generalization of the voting paradox. Moreover, we connect two generalizations, and analyze the conditions for an acyclic collective choice rule. Next, we investigate the decisive structure behind Suzumura consistent collective choice rules. To capture the implication of Suzumura consistency on the decisive structure, we focus on the family of semi-decisive sets. A semi-decisive set is a group that has veto power. It is shown that if a Suzumura consistent collective choice rule satisfies weak Pareto, then the family of semi-decisive sets forms a prefilter.

• 日時：12月10日（木）16時30分から18時
• 場所：早稲田大学早稲田キャンパス1号館4階401教室
• 報告者： 海老名剛　氏（東京工業大学）
• 題目：Option Package Bundling
• 概要：Option package bundling problems arise if there is an optional good, which is valuable only if a certain (non-optional) base good is consumed together. A firm that produces both types of goods then faces the decision of whether to sell them only in a package (pure bundling), or to sell base goods both with or without optional goods, leaving the choice of consuming them together to buyers (mixed bundling). We study a model of a monopolist's option package bundling problem, in which the monopolist produces base and optional ones, with no marginal costs, and buyers' valuations are independently and uniformly distributed. We derive the optimal bundling prices, and verify that mixed bundling outperforms pure bundling if and only if the range of optional good valuation exceeds a certain size. We argue that the result is robust except in the case where the marginal cost is higher than the lowest valuation for an optional good. This suggests an interesting testable implication: the smaller the diversity of the valuation of an optional good, the more likely that the monopolist adopts pure bundling.

• 日時：12月11日（金）16時30分から18時
• 場所：早稲田大学早稲田キャンパス1号館2階現代政治経済研究所会議室
• 報告者： 藤中裕二　氏（首都大学東京）
• 題目：公平分担問題におけるメカニズムデザイン
• 概要：TBA

• 日時：12月15日（火）16時30分から18時
• 場所：早稲田大学早稲田キャンパス1号館2階現代政治経済研究所会議室
• 報告者： Zaifu Yang　氏（横浜国立大学）
• 題目：Constrainedly fair job assignments under minimum wages
• 概要：A number of jobs are to be assigned to a greater number of workers. While having to abide by the law of minimum wages, firms must determine who should be assigned which job and at what salary. In such situations fair (envy-free) allocations usually fail to exist. To cope with this situation, this paper proposes a new concept of fairness, called constrained fairness. Among the set of constrainedly fair allocations, the so-called constrainedly fair and minimal allocations are of particular interest. The reason for this is that the salaries are not only compatible with the minimum wages; they are also optimal from the standpoint of cost-minimizing firms and the assignment of jobs is efficient from the viewpoint of workers. A convergent dynamic procedure that identifies constrainedly fair and minimal allocations is proposed. Furthermore, strategic properties of the mechanism are derived,and two notions of efficiency are evaluated.

• 日時：12月17日（木）16時30分から18時
• 場所：早稲田大学早稲田キャンパス1号館4階401教室
• 報告者： 下津克己　氏（一橋大学）
• 題目：Sequential Estimation of Dynamic Programming Models
• 概要：This paper develops a new computationally attractive procedure for estimating dynamic discrete choice models that is applicable to a wide range of dynamic programming models. The proposed procedure can accommodate unobserved state variables that (i) are neither additively separable nor follow generalized extreme value distribution, (ii) are serially correlated, and (iii) affect the choice set. Our estimation algorithm sequentially updates the parameter estimate and the value function estimate. It builds upon the idea of the iterative estimation algorithm proposed by Aguirregabiria and Mira (2002, 2007) but conducts iteration using the value function mapping rather than the policy iteration mapping. Its implementation is straightforward in terms of computer programming; unlike the Hotz-Miller type estimators, there is no need to reformulate a fixed point mapping in the value function space as that in the space of probability distributions. It is also applicable to estimate models with unobserved heterogeneity. We analyze the convergence property of our sequential algorithm and derive the conditions for its convergence. We develop an approximated procedure which reduces computational cost substantially without deteriorating the convergence rate. We further extend our sequential procedure for estimating dynamic programming models with an equilibrium constraint, which include dynamic game models and dynamic macroeconomic models.

• 日時：12月21日（月）16時30分から18時
• 場所：早稲田大学早稲田キャンパス1号館2階現代政治経済研究所会議室
• 報告者： 小島武仁　氏（Stanford University）
• 題目：Implementing Random Assignments: A Generalization of the Birkhoff-von Neumann Theorem
• 概要：The literature on random mechanisms often describes outcomes incompletely as ``random assignments'' - expressing the probabilities that individual items are assigned to different agents - and the joint constraints that a feasible assignment must satisfy. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition (the ``bihierarchy'' condition) for the set of constraints to have the property that if the random assignment satisfies the constraints in expectation, then it is a randomization over pure assignments that each satisfy the constraints. The sets of constraints generalize those allowed by the celebrated Birkhoff-von Neumann theorem. We also provide a random algorithm to implement any such random assignment. Several applications are described, including (i) single-unit random assignment, such as school choice; (ii) multi-unit random assignment, such as course allocation and fair division; and (iii) two-sided matching problems, such as the scheduling of inter-league sports matchups. The same method also finds applications beyond economics, generalizing previous results on the minimize makespan problem in the computer science literature.

• 日時：1月30日（土）11時から12時
• 場所：早稲田大学早稲田キャンパス1号館3階310
• 報告者：篠潤之介 氏（Rutgers University）
• 題目：Farsighted Stable Sets in Hotelling's Location Games
• 概要：TBA

• 日時：2月1日（月）16時30分から18時
• 場所：早稲田大学早稲田キャンパス1号館2階現代政治経済研究所会議室
• 報告者：Charles Noussair 氏（Tilburg University）
• 題目：Experiment Asset Markets: Bubbles and Crashes※若手研究者向けセミナー
• 概要：TBA

• 日時：2月5日（金）16時30分から18時
• 場所：早稲田大学早稲田キャンパス1号館2階現代政治経済研究所会議室
• 報告者：Charles Noussair 氏（Tilburg University）
• 題目：How Others Influence One’s Behavior: Investigation with fMRI Imaging
• 概要：TBA

• 日時：2月22日（月）16時30分から18時
• 場所：早稲田大学早稲田キャンパス26号館402
• 報告者：Menahem E. Yaari氏（The Hebrew University of Jerusalem）
• 題目：Justice and the Market
• 概要：TBA

2009年度前期スケジュール（予定）

終了したセミナー（2009年度前期）

• 日時：4月20日（月）16時30分から18時
• 場所：早稲田大学早稲田キャンパス1号館2階現代政治経済研究所会議室
• 報告者：中山幹夫　氏（慶應義塾大学）
• 題目：On Coalitional Strategic Games
• 概要：In a strategic cooperative game, we consider four cores alpha, beta, gamma, and the one we call delta which is essentially the same to conjectural cooperative equilibria due to Currarini and Marini. We show that if every player has a dominant strategy, the beta core includes the gamma core, and therefore that the four cores refine themselves in the greek alphabetical order. Two examples will be examined to see how the refinement is realized. While no strict refinement is attained at all in the pure exchange game, a radical reduction of the alpha core is obtained in the commons game, a simple version of the Cournot game, bringing about a single strategy profile as the delta core.

• 日時：5月15日（金）16時30分から18時
• 場所：早稲田大学早稲田校舎1号館4階４０１教室
• 報告者：西村直子　氏（信州大学経済学部）
• 題目：おコメ市場とAverage Price Two-sided Auction
• 概要：TBA

• 日時：5月18日（月）16時30分から18時
• 場所：早稲田大学早稲田キャンパス1号館2階現代政治経済研究所会議室
• 報告者：中原裕之　氏（理化学研究所）
• 題目：価値に基づく意思決定、その時間選好と文脈効果：神経メカニズムとその数理
• 概要：TBA

• 日時：6月1日（月）16時30分から18時
• 場所：早稲田大学早稲田キャンパス1号館2階現代政治経済研究所会議室
• 報告者：Stef Tijs 氏（ティルブルグ大学教授）
• 題目：Lexicographic Optimization in Cooperative Game Theory
• 概要：TBA

• 日時：6月8日（月）16時30分から18時
• 場所：早稲田大学早稲田キャンパス1号館2階現代政治経済研究所会議室
• 報告者：Stef Tijs 氏（ティルブルグ大学教授）
• 題目：Cooperative games and auctions
• 概要：TBA

• 日時：6月17日（水）16時30分から18時
• 場所：早稲田大学早稲田キャンパス1号館2階現代政治経済研究所会議室
• 報告者：John Wooders 氏（University of Arizona）
• 題目：Auction with Heterogeneous Entry Costs
• 概要：詳細につきましては報告者webpageにあります論文pdfファイルをご覧下さい．

• 日時：6月22日（月）16時30分から18時
• 場所：早稲田大学早稲田キャンパス1号館2階現代政治経済研究所会議室
• 報告者：John Wooders 氏（University of Arizona）
• 題目：Does Experience Teach? Professionals and Minimax Play in the Lab
• 概要：詳細につきましては報告者webpageにあります論文pdfファイルをご覧下さい．

• 日時：6月23日（臨時）（火）16時30分から18時
• 場所：早稲田大学早稲田キャンパス1号館2階現代政治経済研究所会議室
• 報告者：笠島　洋一 氏（University of Rochester）
• 題目：Reflecting inequality of claims in gains and losses
• 概要：We consider the problem of dividing a resource among a group of agents who have conflicting claims on it. A typical situation is when a firm goes bankrupt and its liquidation value has to be divided among its creditors. We follow the axiomatic approach. Our main axioms are inequality preservation in gains and inequality preservation in losses [Hougaard, J. L., and Osterdal, L.P., 2005. Inequality preserving rationing. Econ Letters 87, 355-360]. These axioms require rules to reflect the inequality of claims in gains and losses. We characterize the family of rules that are continuous, order preserving in gains and losses, and inequality preserving in gains and losses: (i) for two agents, these axioms hardly restrict rules (in particular, all central rules considered in the literature satisfy them); (ii) for three agents, they are significantly more restrictive but they are satisfied by family containing a continuum of rules; and (iii) for more than three agents, they single out the proportional rule; this result confirms the central role and furthers our understanding of this rule in claims problems.

• 日時：7月13日（月）16時30分から18時
• 場所：早稲田大学早稲田キャンパス1号館2階現代政治経済研究所会議室
• 報告者：坂井 豊貴 氏（横浜国立大学）
• 題目：Choosing someone with monetary transfers: a comprehensive analysis
• 概要：In situations where only one member of a group is assigned an indivisible object, money is often used as a medium to achieve fairness: When the object is an obligation to work for the group, the assigned member is paid monetary compensations for his disutility from the other members; When the object is a good or right, the assigned member pays a certain fraction of his gain to the other members. These situations are formulated as the problem of fairly allocating a single object with monetary transfers. Our purpose is to offer a comprehensive analysis to solve the problem.
  An allocation means an outcome of this problem, consisting of an assigned member and a monetary transfer vector among all members. First, we show that any fair allocation is ranked higher than any non-fair allocation for a wide class of welfare criteria including utilitarian, Nash, or leximin criteria. Second, we design a simple mechanism that simultaneously implements fair allocations in Nash equilibrium and a unique perfectly fair allocation in undominated Nash equilibrium. Third, we test the practical performance of the mechanism by a laboratory experiment. We observe that the mechanism achieves desirable allocations with high probabilities and the mode of played strategy profiles is a unique undominated Nash equilibrium, as is theoretically predicted.

• 日時：7月21日（火）（臨時）16時30分から18時
• 場所：早稲田大学早稲田キャンパス1号館2階現代政治経済研究所会議室
• 報告者：二本杉　剛 氏（大阪大学大学院）
• 題目：Is the Truth-Telling Equilibrium Salient?: An Experiment on Direct Nash Implementation
• 概要：本論文では，メカニズムが複数均衡を持つ際に起こりうる個人間の協調の失敗を，フォーカル・ポイント(Schelling (1960)) によって 避けることができるかどうかを実験によって検証する．本論文では 完備情報下の直接表明メカニズムによる社会的意思決定を考察して いるため，フォーカル・ポイントとなりうる均衡として，正直均衡 が考えられる．よって，同一の社会選択関数を遂行するメカニズム として，複数均衡の一つに正直均衡を持つメカニズムと持たないメ カニズムを設計し，どちらがより高い均衡達成率を実現するのかを 実験によって比較した．その結果，正直均衡を持つメカニズムの方 が有意に高い均衡達成率を示すことがわかった．』

• 日時：7月24日（金）（臨時）16時から18時
• 場所：早稲田大学早稲田キャンパス1号館2階現代政治経済研究所会議室
• 報告者：(1) 岩崎　敦　氏（九州大学）(2) 大田直樹 氏（九州大学大学院）
• 題目：(1) Characterizing False-name-proof Allocation Rules in Combinatorial Auctions
  (2) Coalition Structure Generation Utilizing Compact Characteristic Function Representations
  
• 概要： (1) A combinatorial auction mechanism consists of an allocation rule that defines the allocation of goods for each agent, and a payment rule that defines the payment of each winner. There have been several studies on characterizing strategy-proof allocation rules. In particular, a condition called weak-monotonicity has been identified as a full characterization of strategy-proof allocation rules. More specifically, for an allocation rule, there exists an appropriate payment rule so that the mechanism becomes strategy-proof if and only if it satisfies weak-monotonicity. In this paper, we identify a condition called sub-additivity which characterizes false-name-proof allocation rules. False-name-proofness generalizes strategy-proofness, by assuming a bidder can submit multiple bids under fictitious identifiers. As far as the authors are aware, this is the first attempt to characterize false-name-proof allocation rules. We can utilize this characterization for developing a new false-name-proof mechanism, since we can concentrate on designing an allocation rule. As long as the allocation rule satisfies weak-monotonicity and sub-additivity, there always exists an appropriate payment rule. Furthermore, by utilizing the sub-additivity condition, we can easily verify whether a mechanism is false-name-proof. To our surprise, we found that two mechanisms, which were believed to be false-name-proof, do not satisfy sub-additivity; they are not false-name-proof. As demonstrated in these examples, our characterization is quite useful for mechanism verification.
  
  (2) Forming effective coalitions is a major research challenge in AI and multi-agent systems. Coalition structure generation (CSG), which involves partitioning a set of agents into coalitions so that social surplus is maximized, is a central research topic due to its computational complexity. Traditionally, the input of the CSG problem is a black-box function called a characteristic function, which takes a coalition as an input and returns the value of the coalition. However, characteristic functions that appear in practice often can be represented by a set of rules, rather than a single black-box function. It is likely that we can solve the CSG problem more efficiently by utilizing such rule-based representations and applying constraint optimization techniques to them directly. In this paper, we present new formalizations of the CSG problem by utilizing recently developed compact representation schemes for characteristic functions. We first characterize the complexity of CSG under these representation schemes. In this context, the complexity is driven more by the number of rules rather than by the number of agents. Furthermore, as an initial step towards developing efficient constraint optimization algorithms for solving the CSG problem, we develop mixed integer programming formulations and show that an off-the-shelf optimization package can solve these problems reasonably well, i.e., it can solve instances with a few hundred of agents, while the state-of-the-art algorithm (which does not make use of compact representation) can solve instances up to 27 agents.

• 日時：7月27日（月）16時30分から18時
• 場所：早稲田大学早稲田キャンパス1号館2階現代政治経済研究所会議室
• 報告者：J.J. Herings 氏（Maastricht University）
• 題目：Non-cooperative Support for the Asymmetric Nash Bargaining Solution
• 概要：詳細につきましては報告者webpageにあります論文pdfファイルをご覧下さい．

• 日時：8月31日（月）(1)13時から14時 (2)14時から15時
• 場所：早稲田大学早稲田キャンパス1号館2階現代政治経済研究所会議室
• 報告者：(1) Peter Gardenfors 氏 (Lund University) (2) Jean-Francois Laslier 氏　(Ecole Polytechnique)
• 題目：(1) A representation theorem for voting with logical consequences
  (2) Approval Voting in Theory, in the Field, and in the Lab
• 概要：TBA

• 日時：9月2日（水）16時30分から18時
• 場所：早稲田大学早稲田キャンパス1号館310教室
• 報告者：Walter Bossert　氏（Univerisity Montreal）
• 題目：Economics of Rational Choice
• 概要：TBA

• 日時：9月4日（金）16時30分から18時
• 場所：早稲田大学早稲田キャンパス1号館310教室
• 報告者：Bhaskar Dutta 氏（Univerisity of Warwick）
• 題目：Honest Implementation (joint paper with Arunava Sen)
• 概要：TBA

• 日時：9月15日（火）16時30分から18時
• 場所：早稲田大学早稲田キャンパス1号館2階現代政治経済研究所会議室
• 報告者：Michele Lombardi 氏（University of Surrey）
• 題目：Liberal Egalitarianism and the Harm Principle
• 概要：TBA

関連情報

Games and Auctions: Theory and Experiments

• 講師・報告者：John Wooders (University of Arizona) 　　　
• 概要：John Wooders教授は実験経済学、ゲーム理論、オークション理論、数理経済学の著名な研究者であり、一流国際雑誌に多くの論文を掲載している。今回の一連 のセミナーではオークションをメインテーマとして、理論（主としてゲーム理論）と実験に関して大学院生向け集中講義を行う。
• 連続講義スケジュール（以下はすべて早稲田大学早稲田キャンパスにて行われます．）

  No.	日時	トピック	会場	備考
  Lecture 1	29 May Fri. 14:45-16:15	Mixed-strategy experiments: The O’Neill game and “Blind Stealing”	4-202
  Lecture 2	1 June Mon 13:00-14:30	Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of Blind Stealing. Discussion of experimental results.	4-202	Readings:O Neill, B. (1987): “Nonmetric Test of the Minimax Theory of Two-Person Zero-Sum Games,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 84, 2106-2109. Walker, M., and J. Wooders (2001): “Minimax Play at Wimbledon,” American Economic Review 91, 1521-1538.
  Lecture 3	5 June Fri. 14:45-16:15	Auction experiments: First and second price sealed bid auctions, common value auctions	4-202
  Lecture 4	8 June Mon 13:00-14:30	First Price Auctions	4-202	Readings: Krishna Chapters 1 and 2*
  Lecture 5	12 June Fri. 14:45-16:15	The Revenue Equivalence Principle	4-202	Readings: Krishna Chapter 3*
  Lecture 6	15 June Mon 13:00-14:30	Extensions-risk aversion, budget constraints	4-202	Readings: Krishna Chapter 4*
  Lecture 7	19 June Fri. 14:45-16:15	Mechanism Design	4-202	Readings: Krishna Chapter 5*
  Lecture 8	22 June Mon 13:00-14:30	Buy It Now Auctions	4-202	Readings: Reynolds, S., & J. Wooders (2009): “Auctions with a Buy Price,”EconomicTheory 38, 9-39. Shahriar, Q., and J. Wooders (2007): “An Experimental Study of Auctions with a Buy Price Under Private and Common Values,”University of Arizona Working Paper #07-19.
  Lecture 9	26 June Fri. 14:45-16:15	Auctions with interdependent values	4-202	Readings: Krishna Chapter 6*

  * Krishna,V. “Auction Theory” Academic Press, 2002

Game Theory Lecture Series

• 講師：Rodica Branzei (Alexandru Ioan Cuza University) 　　　
• 概要：Rodica Branzei准教授はStef Tijs教授ら多くのゲーム理論研究者との共著論文がある。今回の連続講義ではRodica Branzei准教授の最近の著書および最新の研究成果に関して、大学院生向けに講義を行う。
• スケジュール（以下はすべて早稲田大学早稲田キャンパスにて行われます．）

  No.	日時	トピック	会場	備考
  Lecture 1	2 June Tue. 16:30-18:00	Multi-choice Games I	4-206
  Lecture 2	3 June Wed. 16:30-18:00	Multi-choice Games II	4-202
  Lecture 3	5 June Fri. 9:00-10:30	Multi-choice Games III	4-202
  Lecture 4	9 June Tue 16:30-18:00	Interval Games I	4-206
  Lecture 5	10 June Wed. 16:30-18:00	Interval Games II	4-202

以下は本研究会に関連するWorkshopの情報です．

• The Sixth Asian General Equilibrium Theory Workshop(GETA2009)
• Waseda Game Theory Workshop
• FRMES2009
• LGS6