Fukuda, E., Y. Kamijo, A. Takeuchi, M. Masui, and Y. Funaki: Theoretical and experimental investigations of the performance of the keyword auction mechanisms, to appear in Rand Journal of Economics (2013).
van den Brink, Rene. Yukihiko Funaki, and Gerard van del Laan, Characterization of the Reverse Talmud bankruptcy rule by Exemption and Exclusion properties, European Journal of Operational Research 228(2013), 413-417.
Rene van den Brink, Yukihiko Funaki and Yuan Ju, "Reconciling marginalism with egalitarianism: consistency, monotonicity, and implementation of egalitarian Shapley values" Social Choice and Welfare (2013), Volume 40, Issue 3, pp 693-714,
Grabisch, M. and Y. Funaki: A Coalition Formation Value for Games in Partition Function Form, European Journal of Operational Research 221 (2012), 175-185.
Vyrastekova, J., Y. Funaki and A. Takeuchi: Sanctioning as a social norm: Expectations of non-strategic sanctioning in a public goods game experiment, Journal of Socio-Economics, 40 (2011), 919-928
Kongo, T., Y. Funaki, R. Branzei and S. Tijs: Non-cooperative and Axiomatic Characterizations of the Average Lexicographic Value, International Game Theory Review 12 (2010), 417-435.
Funaki Y. and R. van den Brink: Axiomatization of a Class of Equal Surplus Sharing Solutions for TU-Games, Theory and Decision 67, 303-340, (2009).
"New Axiomatizations and an Implementation of the Shapley Value," Kongo, T. , Funaki, Y. and Tijs, S.H ,2007.@
"The Uniqueness of a Reduced Game in a Characterization of the Core in terms of Consistency," Y.Funaki and T.Yamato, Advances in Dynamic Games Applications to Economics, Management Science, Engineering, and Environmental Management, 2006.
"Set games," H.Aarts, Y.Funaki, C. Hoede, Power Indices and Coalition Formation, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, The Netherlands, 2001.
"The Core and Consistency Properties: A General Characterization," Y.Funaki and T.Yamato, International Game Theory Review 3, pp175-187, 2001.
"The Core of an Economy with Common Pool Resource: A Partition@Function Form Approach," Y.Funaki and T.Yamato, International Journal Game Theory, Vol.28, pp157-171, 1999
"A Marginalistic Value for Monotonic Set Games," H.F.M.Aarts, Y. Funaki and C.Hoede, International Journal of Game Theory, Vol.26, pp 97-111 1997.
"The Egalitarian Nonpairwise-Averaged Contribution Value for TU-Games," Y.Funakiand T.Driessen, Game Theoretical Applications to Economics and Operations Research, edited by T.Parthasarathy et al., pp51-66, Kluwer Academic Publishers. 1997.
"Reduced Game Properties of Egalitarian Division Rules for TU-Games," Y.Funaki and T.Driessen, Game Theoretical Applications to Economics and Operations Research, edited by T.Parthasarathy et al., pp85-103, Kluwer Academic Publishers. 1997.
"Collinearity between the Shapley Value and the Egalitarian Division Rules for Cooperative Games," I.Dragan, T.S.H.Driessen and Y.Funaki, OR SPEKTRUM, Vol.18, No.2, pp 97-105. 1996.
"Coincidence of and collinearity between game theoretic solutions," T.S.H.Driessen and Y.Funaki, OR SPEKTRUM, Vol.13, No.1, pp 15-30. 1991.
"Upper and lower bounds of the kernel and nucleolus",Yukihiko Funaki, International Journal of Game Theory Vol.15 No.2, pp 121-129 (1986).