Political Science Research Methods (Game Theory)
Spring 201
5

Shuhei Kurizaki
Graduate School of Political Science
Waseda University

[Syllabus] (Last updated on April 8, 201
5)
Fridays, 10:40-12:10


1-2. Introduction to the Course; What is Formal Political Theory and What Is It Good For?; The Rationality Assumption
[Lecture slide]

  • Homework #1 due on May 1, 2015 (9:00AM) to my office (mailbox).


3. Static Games under Complete Information: Normal Form Games and Dominance
[Lecture slide]

  • Gibbons chaps 1.1A and 1.1B
  • MM, chaps 5.1 and 5.2.1


4. Static Games under Complete Information: Nash Equilibrium; Mixed Strategies
[Lecture slide
or Handout]

  • Homework Problem Set #2 due on May 21, 2015 (9:00AM) to your TAs.
  • Homework Problem Set #3 due on May xx, 2015 (9:00AM) to your TAs.
  • Homework Problem Set #4 due on May xx, 2014 (9:00AM) to your TAs.
  • Gibbons chaps 1.1C, 1.3A and 1.3B; skim Appendix 1.1C
  • MM, 5.2.2, 5.4, 5.5, and 5.13; Skim 5.10-5.12
  • Mark Walker and John Wooders. 2001. "Minimax Paly at Wimbledon," American Economics Review, Vol. 91, No. 5 (December), pp. 1521-1538.


5. Static Games under Complete Information: Example: Median Voter Theorem and the Security Dilemma
[Lecture slide]

  • MM, 5.3. Skim chaps 5.6-5.9, skim 5.10-5.12).


6. Dynamic Games under Complete Information: Extensive Form Games; Sequntiality and Political Institutions; The Paradox of Voting
[Lecture slide]

  • MM, Chap 7 Introduction.


7. Dynamic Games under Complete Information: Subgame Perfection and Backward Induction
[Lecture slide]

  • Gibbons, 2.1A, 2.2A, 2.4A-B
  • MM, 7.2


8. Dynamic Games under Complete Information: Stackelberg Model and an Ultimatun Game
[Lecture slide]

  • Gibbons, 2.1B


9. Static Games under Incomplete Information: Incomplete Information as Imperfect Information, Prior Beliefs
[Lecture slide]

  • Gibbons Chaps 3 Intro, 3.1B
  • MM, Chap 6 Intro & 8 Intro


10. Static Games under Incomplete Information: Bayesian Nash Equilibrium
[Lecture Slide]

  • Gibbons 3.1C
  • MM, Chapter 6.1


11. Static Games under Incomplete Information: Condorcet Jury Theorem;l the Battle of the Sexes
[Lecture Slides]

  • Gibbons 3.2A
  • MM, Chapter 6.3-6.7


12. Dynamic Games under Incomplete Information: Sequential rationality and Consistency of beliefs
[Lecture Slides]

13. Dynamic Games under Incomplete Information: Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
[Lecture Slides]

14. Dynamic Games under Incomplete Information: Signaling Games
[Lecture Slide]

  • Gibbons, 4.2
  • MM Chap 8.2


15. Review Session and Take-home Final Exam
[Practice Exam]


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