Political Science Research Methods
(Game Theory)
Spring 2015
Shuhei Kurizaki
Graduate School of Political Science
Waseda University
[Syllabus] (Last updated on April
8, 2015)
Fridays, 10:40-12:10
1-2.
Introduction to the Course; What is Formal Political Theory and What Is It
Good For?; The Rationality Assumption
[Lecture slide]
- Homework #1 due on May 1,
2015 (9:00AM) to my office (mailbox).
3. Static Games under Complete Information: Normal Form Games and
Dominance
[Lecture slide]
- Gibbons
chaps 1.1A and 1.1B
- MM,
chaps 5.1 and 5.2.1
4. Static Games under Complete Information: Nash Equilibrium; Mixed
Strategies
[Lecture slide or Handout]
- Homework Problem Set #2 due on May 21,
2015 (9:00AM) to your TAs.
- Homework
Problem Set #3 due on May xx, 2015
(9:00AM) to your TAs.
- Homework
Problem Set #4 due on May xx, 2014 (9:00AM) to your
TAs.
- Gibbons
chaps 1.1C, 1.3A and 1.3B; skim Appendix 1.1C
- MM,
5.2.2, 5.4, 5.5, and 5.13; Skim 5.10-5.12
- Mark
Walker and John Wooders. 2001. "Minimax
Paly at Wimbledon," American Economics Review, Vol. 91, No.
5 (December), pp. 1521-1538.
5. Static Games under Complete Information: Example: Median Voter Theorem
and the Security Dilemma
[Lecture slide]
- MM,
5.3. Skim chaps 5.6-5.9, skim 5.10-5.12).
6. Dynamic Games under Complete Information: Extensive Form Games; Sequntiality and Political Institutions; The Paradox of
Voting
[Lecture slide]
7. Dynamic Games under Complete Information: Subgame Perfection and Backward
Induction
[Lecture slide]
- Gibbons,
2.1A, 2.2A, 2.4A-B
- MM,
7.2
8. Dynamic Games under Complete Information: Stackelberg
Model and an Ultimatun Game
[Lecture slide]
9. Static Games under Incomplete Information: Incomplete Information as
Imperfect Information, Prior Beliefs
[Lecture slide]
- Gibbons
Chaps 3 Intro, 3.1B
- MM,
Chap 6 Intro & 8 Intro
10. Static Games under Incomplete Information: Bayesian Nash Equilibrium
[Lecture Slide]
- Gibbons
3.1C
- MM,
Chapter 6.1
11. Static Games under Incomplete Information: Condorcet Jury Theorem;l the Battle of the Sexes
[Lecture Slides]
- Gibbons
3.2A
- MM,
Chapter 6.3-6.7
12. Dynamic Games under Incomplete Information: Sequential rationality and
Consistency of beliefs
[Lecture Slides]
13. Dynamic Games under Incomplete Information: Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
[Lecture Slides]
14. Dynamic Games under Incomplete Information: Signaling Games
[Lecture Slide]
15. Review Session and Take-home Final Exam
[Practice Exam]
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