Two Questions about Japan’s National Security

- Why can Japan have the anti-militarist norm and the world class military power?
- Why are there the U.S. military bases in Okinawa?
1. Alliance and National Security
2. The Puzzle of Alliances
3. The Logic of Alliances
4. Why Alliances?
International Security Issues in East Asia

- Provocative Foreign Policies by North Korea
- Military Expansion by China (PRC)
- Militarization by Japan
- Territorial Disputes
  - Dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu/Tiaoyutai Islands in the East China Sea
  - Disputes over the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea
Abe Administration National Security Agendas

- Constitutional Reform
  - Alleged ambitions to revise Article 9
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- Initiatives on Collective Self-Defense
  - To reinforce the US-Japan Alliance
Contemporary Security Issues

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- Constitutional Reform
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- Force Employment
  - “Marine Corps” to enhance deterrence and protection of remote islands
Contemporary Security Issues

Abe Administration National Security Agendas

- **Constitutional Reform**
  - Alleged ambitions to revise Article 9

- **Initiatives on Collective Self-Defense**
  - To reinforce the US-Japan Alliance

- **Force Employment**
  - “Marine Corps” to enhance deterrence and protection of remote islands

- **Offensive Military Capabilities**
  - F35 fighters/ballistic missiles to attack missile launchers abroad
Japan’s National Security

• Japan’s grand strategy remains very simple
Japan’s National Security

- Japan’s grand strategy remains very simple
- U.S.-Japan alliance as the backbone
**US-Japan Alliance**

Security arrangements in which the US promises to defend Japan in the event of an attack on Japan.
Japan’s National Security

US-Japan Alliance

Security arrangements in which the US promises to defend Japan in the event of the attack on Japan

- Active military support
Japan’s National Security

US-Japan Alliance

Security arrangements in which the US promises to defend Japan in the event of the attack on Japan

- Active military support
- Mechanisms for military coordination and preparations in peacetime (e.g., military bases, joint military exercises)
US-Japan Alliance

Security arrangements in which the US promises to defend Japan in the event of the attack on Japan

- **Active military support**
- **Mechanisms for military coordination and preparations in peacetime** (e.g., military bases, joint military exercises)
- **Asymmetric alliance:**
  - **Symmetric:** Members have mutual defense agreements and share equal responsibilities and burdens.
  - **Asymmetric:** The U.S. is obliged to defend Japan, but Japan is not expected to protect the U.S. if the U.S. military or homeland were attacked.
1 Alliance and National Security
2 The Puzzle of Alliances
3 The Logic of Alliances
4 Why Alliances?
Two Faces of Alliances

1. The U.S. will fight on the side of Japan in the event of an armed conflict (Intervention)
Two Faces of Alliances

1. The U.S. will fight on the side of Japan in the event of an armed conflict *(Intervention)*

2. Intervention commitment and military presence in Japan will deter military challenges *(Extended Deterrence)*
Two Faces of Alliances

1. The U.S. will fight on the side of Japan in the event of an armed conflict \(\text{(Intervention)}\)

2. Intervention commitment and military presence in Japan will deter military challenges \(\text{(Extended Deterrence)}\)
   - Prevent crises and militarized disputes from arising \(\text{(General Deterrence)}\)
   - Prevent attacks in crises or militarized disputes \(\text{(Immediate Deterrence)}\)
A Model of International Disputes

Challenger

No Challenge

Status Quo

Concede

Challenge

Target

Resist

Territorial Concession

Crisis or Militarized Dispute
A Model of International Crises

Challenger

No Challenge

Challenge

Target

Resist

Challenger

Status Quo

Concede

Territorial
Concession
Back Down

Status Quo

Armed Conflict

Attack
A Model of Alliances

Defender

No Alliance

Challenger

No Challenge

Status Quo

Concede

Territorial

Concession

Back Down

Challenge

Target

Resist

Challenger

Attack

Status Quo

Armed Conflict
Two Faces of Alliance: Intervention

- No Alliance
  - Challenger
    - No Challenge
      - Status Quo
      - Concede
        - Territorial Concession
          - Back Down
        - Resist
          - Challenger
            - Attack
              - Defender intervenes
              - Armed Conflict
            - Status Quo
          - Concede
            - Defender Commitment

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- Alliance
  - Commitment
    - Defender

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Two Faces of Alliance: General Deterrence

- No Alliance
  - No Challenge
    - Status Quo
    - Concede
      - Territorial Concession
        - Back Down
      - Challenge
        - Target
          - Resist
            - Attack
              - Armed Conflict
    - Challenge
      - Defender
        - Alliance Commitment
          - General Deterrence
            - Crisis or Militarized dispute
Two Faces of Alliances: Immediate Deterrence

- Defender
  - No Alliance
    - No Challenge
    - Status Quo
    - Concede
  - Challenge
    - Target
    - Resist
      - Territorial Concession
        - Back Down
      - Challenger
      - Armed Conflict

Immediate Deterrence
Why Alliance? Why Intervention?

Power Aggregation Model of Alliance

Why states want to form alliance?

- $S_1$ and $S_2$ have common interests in the outcome of bargaining with $S_C$.
- Military cooperation can improve fighting effectiveness and reduce the cost of fighting.
- Information influences $S_C$’s strategic assessment.
Why Alliance? Why Intervention? Power Aggregation

Bargaining Range without Alliance

Bargaining Range with Alliance

$p - c_1$  $p$  $p + c_2$

$p' - c_1$  $p'$  $p' + c'_2$  $p' - c_C$
Problems with Alliances

- Alliances are not necessary for interventions
The Puzzle of Alliances

Problems with Alliances

- Alliances are not necessary for interventions
  - Wartime coalitions without peacetime arrangements
Problems with Alliances

- Alliances are not necessary for interventions
  - Wartime coalitions without peacetime arrangements
    - “Coalition of the Willing” during the 2003 Iraq War
    - United Nations Command in the Korean War
The Puzzle of Alliances

Problems with Alliances

1. Alliances are not necessary for interventions
   - Wartime coalitions without peacetime arrangements

2. Alliances have no effect on extended deterrence
Problems with Alliances

1. Alliances are not necessary for interventions
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2. Alliances have no effect on extended deterrence
   - Alliances should enhance general deterrence, but no definitive evidence
   - Alliances do not contribute to immediate deterrence
Problems with Alliances

1. Alliances are not necessary for interventions
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2. Alliances have no effect on extended deterrence
   - Alliances should enhance general deterrence, but no definitive evidence
   - Alliances do not contribute to immediate deterrence
     - What matters is rapidly deployable forces (e.g., Marine Corps)
Problems with Alliances

1. Alliances are not necessary for interventions
   - Wartime coalitions without peacetime arrangements

2. Alliances have no effect on extended deterrence
   - Alliances should enhance general deterrence, but no definitive evidence
   - Alliances do not contribute to immediate deterrence

3. Historically, 20% of alliance commitments were violated
1 Alliance and National Security

2 The Puzzle of Alliances

3 The Logic of Alliances

4 Why Alliances?
Why Do States Form an Alliance?

- Alliances seem unnecessary to achieve the stated goals
- Alliances seem ineffective to deliver their promises
- And yet, alliances are very costly to form and maintain
The Puzzle of Alliance

Why Do States Form an Alliance?

- Alliances seem unnecessary to achieve the stated goals
- Alliances seem ineffective to deliver their promises
- And yet, alliances are very costly to form and maintain
  - Peacetime costs (Material, psychological, political costs)
  - Risk of entrapment (Dragged into an unwarranted war)
Alliances serve as credible mechanisms for deterrent signals.

- Alliances convey information about:
  - Common interests between allies
  - Enhanced ability of fighting
- Information influences challengers’ strategic assessment
Why Signaling?

Why should alliances send deterrent signals to challengers?
The Logic of Alliance

Why Signaling?
Why should alliances send deterrent signals to challengers?

- Why do states need to send signals?
The Logic of Alliance

Why Signaling?
Why should alliances send deterrent signals to challengers?
- Why do states need to send signals?
- Why do states need alliances to send signals?
The Logic of Alliance

Why Signaling?
Why should alliances send deterrent signals to challengers?

- Why do states need to send signals?
- Why do states need alliances to send signals?

Key to the Answer
Credibility problems in extended deterrence

- Under anarchy, no enforcement agency
- Countries are free to renege on promises
- Uncertainty over the willingness and capability to fulfill intervention commitments
Credibility Problems of Deterrence

Even if an intervention commitment were credible, challengers would not be convinced that such a commitment was credible.
The Logic of Alliance

Credibility Problems of Deterrence

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- All defenders want their commitments to appear credible
Credibility Problems of Deterrence

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- Non-credible defenders have incentives to misrepresent their true type
Credibility Problems of Deterrence

Even if an intervention commitment were credible, challengers would not be convinced that such a commitment was credible.

- All defenders want their commitments to appear credible
- Non-credible defenders have incentives to misrepresent their true type
- Thus, a challenger should doubt the credibility of any intervention commitment
Overcoming Credibility Problems

Establishing the credibility of intervention commitments requires distinguishing credible commitments from non-credible ones.
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- States use “signals” to communicate commitments and their credibility.
Establishing the credibility of intervention commitments requires distinguishing credible commitments from non-credible ones.

- States use “signals” to communicate commitments and their credibility
- What signals allow states to do this?
To establish credibility, credible types must take actions that non-serious types cannot afford to take.
Overcoming Credibility Problems

To establish credibility, credible types must take actions that non-serious types cannot afford to take

- The formation and maintenance of alliance imposes costs that non-credible allies are unwilling to pay
To establish credibility, credible types must take actions that non-serious types cannot afford to take

- The formation and maintenance of alliance imposes costs that non-credible allies are unwilling to pay

The Cost of Alliance

- Increased risk of war (“Fear of Entrapment”)
- Peacetime costs (Financial costs & political costs)
- Reputational costs (Future credibility at risk)
Alliances as Costly Signals

- Alliances are one of the strongest types of signals available among a variety of foreign policy options.
- Thus, alliances can be very useful signaling behavior because they are costly.
The Logic of Alliance

Alliances as Costly Signals

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- Thus, alliances can be very useful signaling behavior because they are costly.

Solution to the Puzzle

- The cost of alliance makes the formation and maintenance of alliance puzzling.
- But precisely because of this costliness, states bother to form alliances.
The Okinawa Question

Most crucial components of the cost for Japan

- Suffering of the people in Okinawa
- Antagonism between Okinawa and Tokyo
- Paradoxically, the protests in Okinawa and the fall of cabinets would lend the U.S.-Japan alliance more credibility
The Okinawa Question

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Military Bases in Okinawa as a Tripwire

- U.S. military bases in Okinawa turn extended deterrence into direct deterrence for the U.S.
- Unlike extended deterrence, no question of credibility for direct deterrence
- Aggression against Japan/Okinawa will automatically invoke the U.S. military intervention
Policy Implications

Judging the rationality of alliances

- Not by evaluating whether intervention commitments are honored

- But by evaluating on how many occasions challengers are deterred from initiating a crisis or militarized dispute
Policy Implications

Judging the rationality of alliances

- Not by evaluating whether intervention commitments are honored
  - The first and explicit function of the U.S.-Japan alliance
  - Observable
- But by evaluating on how many occasions challengers are deterred from initiating a crisis or militarized dispute
Policy Implications

Judging the rationality of alliances

- Not by evaluating whether intervention commitments are honored

- But by evaluating on how many occasions challengers are deterred from initiating a crisis or militarized dispute
  - The implicit but more important function of the alliance
  - Not observable, if successful
Why Use Alliance to Send Credible Signals?

The logic above is only half of the answer.

- Why do states have to use alliances to send credible signals?
- Why not other means?
The Question about the U.S.-Japan Alliance

Why Alliance?

- National security strategy: Arms versus Alliances
- Alliance as a substitute for buying and developing weapons
- A strategy of buck-passing
Benefits to Japan

- Economic interest in relying on the U.S. military protection (c.f. Yoshida Doctrine)
- Defense obligation as a response to the fear of “abandonment”
Strange Bedfellows

Benefits to Japan

- Economic interest in relying on the U.S. military protection (c.f. Yoshida Doctrine)
- Defense obligation as a response to the fear of “abandonment”

Benefits to the U.S.

- Unique strategic geography as an outpost for the defense line
- Guaranteed military basing in Japan with 70-80% of the cost covered by Japan
Why the U.S. Provides Japan’s National Security?

A Common Interest

Stability of peace in East Asia
- Without the alliance, Japanese military buildup would follow
- Mistrust and animosity towards Japan due to historical memories of WW II

The U.S. presence as reassurance
- A safeguard for otherwise heightened security dilemma
- A major factor in containing potential tensions
Future of the U.S.-Japan Alliance

Changing Security Environment

In the post Cold War era, the security environment has changed.

- Japan no longer faces a major conventional military challenge
- A new threat of regional conflict over territorial claims
- A new threat of nuclear-armed ballistic missiles from North Korea
future of the u.s.-japan alliance

“modernizing” the defense cooperation

- the u.s. wants japanese commitment to new burden-sharing roles
- japan fears the “abandonment” by passing the “buck”
- the 1995 “nye report” through abe administration’s national security agendas
Another Okinawa Question

Relocating the U.S. military bases out of Okinawa?

- Japan will lose a major source of credibility
- U.S. will lose a tripwire
- Rapidly deployable forces will lose the advantage
Future of the U.S.-Japan Alliance

- Constitutional Reform
- Initiatives on Collective Self-Defense
- New Force Employment
- Offensive Military Capabilities
Future of the U.S.-Japan Alliance

- Constitutional Reform
  - Major shift in the arms vs. alliances tradeoff may lead to security dilemma in the region
- Initiatives on Collective Self-Defense
- New Force Employment
- Offensive Military Capabilities
Future of the U.S.-Japan Alliance

- Constitutional Reform

- Initiatives on Collective Self-Defense
  - Meet the American demand but increase the risk of entrapment
  - May trigger the heightened security dilemma in the region

- New Force Employment

- Offensive Military Capabilities
Future of the U.S.-Japan Alliance

- Constitutional Reform
- Initiatives on Collective Self-Defense
- New Force Employment
  - “Marine Corps” and Ospreys will enhance immediate deterrence and protection of remote islands
- Offensive Military Capabilities
Future of the U.S.-Japan Alliance

- Constitutional Reform

- Initiatives on Collective Self-Defense

- New Force Employment

- Offensive Military Capabilities
  - F35 fighters and missile defense (e.g., TMD) may undermine the strategic balance
  - Preemptive missile defense not endorsed by the U.S. leaders
Thank you!