What is Collective Security?

- Institution to promote multilateral cooperation for the maintenance of peace and stability
- Can collective security cause peace?
- Examples:
  - League of Nations
  - United Nations
  - Organization of American States
  - African Union
  - OCSE

Characteristics of Collective Security

- Aggression against one state deemed as aggression against all the members
- All members are obliged to aid the victim state in the event of aggression
- Presumes common interest in the prevention of aggression
- Goal: Deter potential aggressors
  - Carry out punitive sanctions against aggression
  - Peaceful change of the SQ, not prevention of challenge against the SQ

Objectives and Functions

1. Prevent threats against int'l peace and stability
   - Credible mechanism (Self-enforcing, subgame perfect)
   - Mechanism to make “forceful change of the SQ” not incentive compatible
   - Punitive actions against aggression
   - Peaceful change in the SQ
2. Institutions to promote international cooperation
   - Same as alliance

Common Interest and Potential Adversary

- Alliance presumes common interest against potential (common) adversary
- CS presumes common interests in “peace and stability” of the system
  - ⇒ No specific potential adversary

Goals

- Alliance is to improve bargaining power
  ⇒ Extract concessions through enhanced deterrence
- CS is to promote peaceful means and avoid force
  ⇒ Provide a mechanism for changing the SQ
**Collective Security**

**Procedure and Protocol (Same as in Deterrence)**
1. Use or threat of force by aggressor
2. Determine a threat to "Int'l peace and stability"
3. Request members to sanction against aggressor
   - Economic and/or military sanctions

**Institutional mechanism at the UN**
- **Security Council**: 15 countries
  - Permanent 5 and veto power
  - Right to determine the threat and sanctions
  - SC resolution binds all the member states

**Collective Security and the United Nations**

**Designed to overcome collective action problems**
- Collective security as a public good
- Collective security as a collective action
- Private incentives against provision of the good

**Solution**: Security Council and Veto Power

- Privilege to small group to provide
  - Privilege to a small group and incentive to provide the public good
  - Side effect: SC blocks resolutions

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**Ineffective Collective Security through the UN**

**Cold War Politics and the Ineffectiveness**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Cold War, 1945–89</th>
<th>Post–Cold War, 1990–2011</th>
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<tr>
<td>Security Council resolutions approved</td>
<td>646</td>
<td>1,386</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vetoed resolutions</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>25</td>
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<tr>
<td>Peacekeeping missions</td>
<td>18</td>
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**Examples: Veto Deadlock**
- Chinese invasion into Tibet (1950): Call for military intervention was vetoed.
- Darfur Massacre in Sudan: Call for economic sanctions against Sudan blocked by China

**UN invoked collective security only twice (under special circumstances)**

- **Korean War (1950)**
  - Conflict of Interest due to the Cold War (N. Korea as a Soviet ally)
  - Resolution 83 passed
  - USSR boycotted the SC due to the Taiwan question

- **Persian Gulf War (1991)**
  - End of the Cold War and the New World Order
  - Resolution 678 passed
  - Iraq as a Soviet ally but détente with the West

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**Collective Security and the United Nations**

**Type of Sanctions against Threats to Peace**

1. **Peace enforcement**
   - Korean War (1950); Gulf War (1991)

2. **Peacekeeping**
   - Golan Heights and Cambodian Missions

**Changing Nature of Collective Security**

- Originally designed for interstate problems
- Recently, it addresses political violence and armed conflict within a state
- Humanitarian Intervention

**UN Peace Keeping Operations**

**PKO as UN activity**

1. Key instrument: **Institution not military power**
   - Customary law
   - Institution for int’l peace and stability
   - Not specified in the UN Charter

2. Goal is to ensure compliance with peace agreement
   - Manage the risk in cease-fire agreement
   - Replace ineffective UN collective security
   - Require a cease-fire agreement
Five Principles for PKO

- No direct mention of PKO in UN Charter
- Dag Hammarskjöld: Article 6 and a half
  - Article 6: Peaceful resolution of conflict
  - Article 7: Peace enforcement
- Five principles (norms) to govern PKO
  1. UN sanctions
  2. Consent of the belligerents
  3. Neutrality and impartiality
  4. Temporal solution
  5. Non-use of force

Overcoming the Compliance Problem

Collaboration Problem

- Peace with compliance = mutually beneficial
- Fighting and ultimately defeating the opponent improves the utility
  ⇒ Incentive for unilateral defection
  ⇒ A typical "Prisoners' Dilemma" situation

- Uncertain prospect for complying with cease-fire
  ⇒ Hesitate to enter the agreement
- Cumulative mistrust against each other via fighting
  ⇒ Overcoming the commitment problem difficult

PKO and its Problems

Deployment
- Place monitoring troops and peacekeepers in the buffer between the belligerents
- Monitor cease-fire, de-mobilization
- Prerequisite: cease-fire agreement

Rationale: A solution to a commitment problem.
- Mutual desire for compliance does not guarantee the compliance with the truce
  ⇒ Uncertainty and mistrust on the opponent’s willingness for compliance
  ⇒ Unilateral defection from the agreement

Overcoming the Compliance Problem

PKO: a solution to the commitment problem
- Accept PKO: Signal a strong will for compliance
- PKO gives “credibility” to the commitment to the cease-fire agreement

Direct impact of PKO
- Contribute to the maintenance of peace
Indirect impact of PKO
- Temporal cease-fire still nurture mutual trust
- Helps to overcome uncertainty and mistrust

Problems with PKO

- PKO rarely produces peace-agreement (treaty)
- Managing “deadlock”
  - PKO is not envisioned to generate a peace treaty
  - Vulnerable to peace spoiler
    - Many cases of failed PKO dealing with political violence by non-state actors

Ineffectiveness of Old-School PKO

Changing environment for PKO
1. More intrastate conflict than interstate conflict
2. Visible shift in 1990s

Old-school PKO
- Presumes the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention
- Regional conflict by non-state actors
- PKO cannot be deployed

Expansion of missions for PKO
- Agenda for Peace”
- From peace-keeping to peace-building
Preventive Diplomacy and Peace-building

1. Conflict mediation and Regime Change

2. Aid for refugees: return to the home country and advocacy of human rights (Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor)
   - ... and the creation of a “peace zone” as a new mission

3. Police enforcement, economic recovery, and election monitoring in the post-conflict societies (Haiti, East Timor, Nicaragua)

Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration

Modernizing PKO