The conference emphasizes discussions on new ideas/foundations in game theory/economics/related topics, as well as communications between participants.
Anybody interested in the subjects and conference is very welcome.
Waseda Campus, 3rd Building, 10th Floor, 1st Conference Room
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9th March 2019:
9:30-9:40: Introduction and some announcements
9:45-10:45: Yanjing Wang, Philosophy, Peking University,
China
Epistemic logics of knowing
how
10:50-11:50: Jeffrey J. Kline, Economics, University of Queensland,
Australia
Normalizations for games of imperfect recall(with Priscilla Man)
11:55-12:25: Ryohei Shimoda, Economics, Waseda University,
Japan
Majority
voting game with minority protection; the core and supperadditivity
12:25-14:00
Lunch
14:00-15:00: Christian List, London School of Economics, England,
Reason-based
choice
15:00-15:10 Coffee
15:10-16:10: Ryuichiro Ishikawa, International Research &
Education, Waseda Univ.
Dialogue
games for argumentation
16:15-17:15: Yukio Koriyama, CREST, Ecole
Polytechnique,
Paris, France
The
winner-take-all dilemma (with Kazuya Kikuchi, Waseda University)
Reception: 17:40 - 20:00:
Quatre Fontaines (in the front of the main gate) 03-3232-8555
10th March 2019:
9:45-10:45: Takayuki Oishi, Economics, Meisei University
A generalization
of Peleg's representation theorem on constant-sum weighted
majority games
10:50-11:50: Adam Dominiak, Economics, Virginia Polytechnic
Institute and State
University, USA
Ambiguity under growing awareness
11:50-13:15: Lunch:
13:15-
14:15: Oliver Schulte, Computer Sciences, Simon Fraser University,
Vancouver, Canada
Belief revision and induction
14:20-15:20:
Satoru
Shimokawa, Economics, Waseda University, Japan.
Rumors and inertia after
the Fukushima nuclear power plant accident
15:20-15:30: Coffee
15:30-16:30:
Mamoru Kaneko, Economics, Waseda University, Japan
Expected utility
theory with probability grids and preference formation
16:35-17:35:
Free discussions on collaborative graduate educations on economics