

**The 11th Pan Pacific Game Theory Conference and
TGU Empirical Analyses of Political Economy Symposium**

Program

9th March 2019:

9:30-9:40: Introduction and some announcements

9:45-10:45: Yanjing Wang, Philosophy, Peking University, China
Epistemic logics of knowing how

10:50-11:50: Jeffrey J. Kline, Economics, University of Queensland, Australia
Normalizations for games of imperfect recall (with Priscilla Man)

11:55-12:25: Ryohei Shimoda, Economics, Waseda University, Japan
Majority voting game with minority protection; the core and superadditivity

12:25-14:00 Lunch

14:00-15:00: Christian List, London School of Economics, England,
Reason-based choice

15:00-15:10 Coffee

15:10-16:10: Ryuichiro Ishikawa, International Research & Education, Waseda Univ.
Dialogue games for argumentation

16:15-17:15: Yukio Koriyama, CREST, Ecole Polytechnique, Paris, France
The winner-take-all dilemma (with Kazuya Kikuchi, Waseda University)

Reception: 17:40 - 20:00:

Quatre Fontaines (in the front of the main gate) 03-3232-8555

10th March 2019:

9:45-10:45: Takayuki Oishi, Economics, Meisei University

A generalization of Peleg's representation theorem on constant-sum weighted majority games

10:50-11:50: Adam Dominiak, Economics, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, USA

Ambiguity under growing awareness

11:50-13:15: Lunch:

13:15- 14:15: Oliver Schulte, Computer Sciences, Simon Fraser University, Vancouver, Canada

Belief revision and induction

14:20-15:20: Satoru Shimokawa, Economics, Waseda University, Japan.

Rumors and inertia after the Fukushima nuclear power plant accident

15:20-15:30: Coffee

15:30-16:30: Mamoru Kaneko, Economics, Waseda University, Japan

Expected utility theory with probability grids and preference formation

16:35-17:35: Free discussions on collaborative graduate educations on economics

Program Committee

Mamoru Kaneko and Ryuichiro Ishikawa

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